In a zero-sum game scenario, two players must choose their strategies simultaneously. If Player A chooses to signal a strong position while Player B interprets that signal as weak, what is the likely outcome regarding their strategies at Nash equilibrium?

In a zero‑sum game, each player wants the other to lose. If Player A signals a strong position but Player B thinks that signal means weakness, B will pick a strategy that exploits this belief, such as an aggressive counterattack. Because A’s signal is misread, A’s chosen strategy will be countered by B’s best reply, and A will not gain an advantage. At Nash equilibrium the two strategies settle so that neither player can improve by changing alone; here that means A’s signal is ignored and B’s response to the perceived weakness becomes the optimal choice. For example, if A pretends to have many pawns while B thinks the pawn structure is weak, B will launch a rapid attack that wins the game.